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Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  Settlement,	  Public	  
Interest	  and	  U.S.	  Domestic	  Law	  
Through	  ISDS,	  foreign	  investors	  can	  claim	  greater	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  rights	  than	  they	  are	  otherwise	  permitted	  under	  domestic	  law,	  undermining	  the	  balance	  between	  public	  and	  private	  rights	  that	  is	  set	  in	  the	  domestic	  legal	  framework;	  Expanding	  ISDS	  by	  including	  it	  in	  new	  trade	  and	  investment	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  (TPP)	  and	  the	  Trans-­‐Atlantic	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Partnership	  (TTIP)	  will	  expose	  the	  US	  government	  to	  new	  claims	  and	  liabilities	  challenging	  government	  action	  and	  inaction	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  government	  –	  local,	  state,	  and	  federal;	  There	  is	  no	  compelling	  need	  that	  warrants	  accepting	  the	  risks	  that	  ISDS	  poses	  to	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system.	  
Introduction  
The  Obama  Administration   is  pushing   to   integrate   investor-­‐‑
state   dispute   settlement   (ISDS)   in   the   trade   and   investment  
treaties  it  is  negotiating  with  the  EU  (the  Trans-­‐‑Atlantic  Trade  
and   Investment   Partnership  Agreement,   TTIP),   the   11   other  
countries   that   form   part   of   the   proposed   Trans-­‐‑Pacific  
Partnership  agreement  (the  TPP),  and  the  bilateral  treaty  with  
China.      While   the   ISDS   mechanism   is   in   the   US   Model  
Bilateral   Investment   Treaty,   as   well   as   in   many   other  
investment  treaties  in  force,  the  serious  shortcomings  of  ISDS  
in   its   current   form   are   becoming   evident.   Multinational  
companies  are  increasingly  using  ISDS  to  challenge  the  legal  
and  regulatory  systems  and  policy  choices  of  the  contracting  
states,   posing   a   serious   and   growing   risk   to   the   ability   of  
states  to  govern  in  the  public  interest.    
ISDS   is   a   mechanism   that   allows   foreign   individuals   and  
foreign  companies  to  sue  host-­‐‑country  governments  through  
ad   hoc   arbitration   proceedings   rather   than   through   normal  
domestic  administrative  and  judicial  channels.  
Key	  Points	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The	  Investor-­‐State	  Dispute	  Settlement	  (ISDS)	  provision	  in	  trade	  and	  investment	  agreements	  poses	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  development,	  enforcement	  and	  application	  of	  domestic	  law;	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 ISDS  has  several  notable  features:i  
• Foreign  investors  alone  (including  their  subsidiaries  and  shareholders)  are  able  to   initiate  
claims  against  the  government;  the  government  cannot  initiate  an  ISDS  proceeding.  
• The  decision-­‐‑makers  in  these  ISDS  proceedings  are  private  arbitrators  appointed  on  a  case-­‐‑
by-­‐‑case  basis  to  decide  the  investors’  claims  against  the  host  government.    
• When  deciding  the  case,  the  substantive  law  the  arbitrators  apply  is  not  the  domestic  law  of  
the  “host”  state  that  normally  governs  the  investment.  Rather,  it  is  the  law  of  the  treaty,  as  
interpreted  by  the  arbitrators.  
• Treaty  standards  are  typically  drafted  in  very  vague,  broad  terms,  giving  arbitrators  in  
each  case  substantial  latitude  to  determine  what  the  standards  mean  in  practice;  because  
there  is  no  appellate  mechanism,  and  there  are  strong  rules  on  enforcement  of  awards,  
there  are  only  very  limited  checks  on  tribunals’  powers  of  interpretation.    
• If   the   arbitrators   find   that   the   government   violated   the   treaty,   they   can   order   the  
government  to  pay  the  investor  substantial  damages.  Cases  to  date  have  included  awards  
of  millions  or  even  billions  of  dollars  for  breaching  the  treaty.  Arbitrators  can  and  have  also  
ordered   “injunctive   relief”,   often   in   the   form   of   interim  measures,   effectively  mandating  
governments  to  take,  or  not  take,  certain  actions.ii  
• There  are   limited  avenues   to  challenge  arbitral  awards;  errors  of   law  or   fact  are   typically  
not   grounds   for   overturning   the   decisions.   If   a   tribunal   issues   an   award   against   the  
government,  courts  of  most  countries  are  required  to  enforce  it.    
  
These  and  other  aspects  of  ISDS  create  a  privileged  and  powerful  avenue  through  which  foreign  
investors  can  challenge  the  actions  of  host  governments  whether  at  the  local,  state,  or  federal  level,  
and  whether  taken  by  the  executive,  legislative,  or  judicial  branch.  ISDS  provisions  had  long  been  
relatively   unknown   and   unused   features   of   treaties,   but   over   the   past   fifteen   years,   companies  
have  increasingly  become  aware  of  them,  and  the  number  of  claims  against  governments  has  risen  
dramatically.  
Available  evidence  regarding  the  approximately  600  known  ISDS  suits  filed  to  date  indicate  that  
investors  can  use   the  mechanism  to  contest  a  virtually  unlimited  range  of  actions   (or   inactions),  
including  measures  relating  to  taxation,  environmental  regulation,  tariffs  for  water  and  electricity,  
health  insurance  regulation,  and  health  and  safety  regulations  of  pharmaceutical  imports,  among  
others.   Foreign   investors   have   also   used   investment   treaties   to   challenge   unfavorable   court  
decisions  issued  in  litigation  between  the  investors  and  third  parties  such  as  industry  competitors  
or  tort  plaintiffs.  Just  a  small  sample  of  ISDS  cases  include  those  seeking  compensation  for:  
• New  and   stronger   environmental   regulations   (e.g.,  Glamis  Gold  v.  United  States;iii  Lone  Pine  v.  
Canadaiv);  
• Termination   of   contracts   with   investors   in   accordance   with   contractual   provisions   (e.g.,  
Occidental  v.  Ecuador  IIv);  
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• Revocation   or   invalidation   of   permits   authorizing   investors’   operations   (e.g.,  Renco  v.  Peru;vi  
Infinito  Gold  v.  Costa  Ricavii);  
• Decisions  not  to  grant  permits  or  not  to  go  ahead  with  projects  (e.g.,  Pac  Rim  v.  El  Salvadorviii;  
Bilcon  v.  Canadaix;  PSEG  v.  Turkeyx;  MTD  v.  Chilexi);  
• Changes   to   fiscal   regimes   (e.g.  Perenco  v.  Ecuadorxii;  Burlington  v.  Ecuadorxiii;   and  Occidental   v.  
Ecuador  Ixiv);  
• Requirements   to   purchase   local   goods   and   services   or   invest   in   research   and   development  
(e.g.,  Mobil  v.  Canadaxv);    
• Obligations  of  states  to  respond  to,  prevent,  or  stop  harm  caused  by  third  persons  or  to  affect  
outcome   of   litigation   with   third   persons   (e.g.,  RDC   v.   Guatemalaxvi;   Chevron   v.   Ecuador   IIxvii;  
Infinito  Gold  v.  Costa  Ricaxviii;  Eli  Lilly  v.  Canadaxix);    
• Actions   to   change   or   not   change   tariffs   for   public   services   (Teco   v.   Guatemalaxx  Iberdola   v.  
Guatemalaxxi);  
• Judicial  interpretations  of  the  scope  of  patent  protections  for  pharmaceutical  products  (Eli  Lilly  
v.  Canadaxxii);    
• Phase-­‐‑out  of  nuclear  power  (Vattenfall  v.  Germanyxxiii);    
• Health  measures   such  as  anti-­‐‑tobacco   legislation  and   regulation   (Philip  Morris  v.  Australiaxxiv;  
Philip  Morris  v.  Uruguayxxv);  and  
• Attempts  to  restructure  sovereign  debt  (Abaclat  v.  Argentinaxxvi;  Ambiente  Ufficio  v.  Argentinaxxvii;  
Alemanni  v.  Argentinaxxviii).  
  
As   this   Policy   Paper   discusses,   ISDS   provides   significant   substantive   and   procedural   rights   to  
individuals   and   corporations   based   solely   on   their   foreign   nationality,   and   outsources  
development   and   interpretation   of   law   to   private   arbitrators   insulated   from   crucial   checks   and  
balances.   Through   this   grant   of   rights   and   transfer   of   lawmaking   power,   ISDS   threatens   to  
undermine  legal  systems  and  policymaking  at  the  domestic  level.    
While  the  US  Government  has  tried  to  dispel  concerns  about  including  ISDS  in  future  trade  and  
investment  agreements,  its  assertions  do  not  adequately  consider  the  issues  posed  by  ISDS.  Rather  
than  promoting   ISDS,   the  US  Government   should   opt   for   other  methods   of   protecting   investor  
rights  and  ensuring  government  compliance  with  treaty  commitments.  
  
Granting	  Protections	  for	  Foreign	  Investors	  
  
Throughout   the   discussion   below   it   is   important   to   keep   in   mind   the   context   in   which   the  
Administration   is  proposing   to   expand   ISDS.  The  US  and  many  other  governments  have   taken  
various  measures  to  attract  and  facilitate  investment,  on  the  basis  that  investments  (both  foreign  
and  domestic)  and  general  business  activities  are  important  for  sustained  economic  growth.    
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In  order  to  facilitate  and  encourage  such  investment,  the  US  legal  system  has  evolved  to  protect  
investors’   rights  and   interests   from  improper   treatment  and  undue   interference  by  government,  
allowing   foreign   and   domestic   individuals   and   entities   in   the   US   to   challenge   government  
conduct  on  myriad  constitutional,  statutory,  tort,  and  contract-­‐‑based  grounds.xxix    
Nevertheless,   as   the   domestic   legal   framework   has   evolved   to   protect   investors’   economic  
interests,  it  has  also  evolved  to  reflect  the  fundamental  importance  of  the  government’s  ability  to  
regulate  investors  and  their  activities  for  the  safety,  health,  security,  and  social  interests  of  other  
parties.   The   resulting   balance   that   has   been   struck   in   domestic   law   is   reflected   in   a   host   of  
complex  and  detailed  substantive  and  procedural  rules  governing  who  can  bring  claims  against  
the  government,  under  what  circumstances,  through  what  processes,  for  what  types  of  harms,  and  
for  what  remedies.    Moreover,  this  balance  is  a  “living”  balance  in  that  the  democratic  institutions  
establishing  this  framework  can  contribute  to  its  continual  evolution  and  refinement  over  time  in  
response  to  changes  in  knowledge,  needs  and  priorities.  
However,   ISDS  completely  circumvents   the  very  balance  between  private  and  public  rights   that  
has  developed  in  the  domestic  context,  and  undermines  the  institutions  that  continue  to  shape  it.  
Importantly,   excluding   ISDS   in   US   treaties   would   not   undo   protection   of   investors’   economic  
interests   in   the   country.   Foreign   investors   have   access   to   domestic   courts,   where   domestic  
investors  also  adjudicate  any  disputes.    
Some  commentators,  including  President  Obama,  have  noted  that  although  ISDS  is  not  necessary  
for  investors  investing  in  the  US,  it  is  crucial  to  include  it  in  treaties  with  other  countries  to  protect  
the  economic  interests  of  US  investors  abroad,  particularly  in  countries  where  there  may  be  less  
developed  protections  for  foreign  investors.  There  are  a  number  of  responses  to  this  argument.    
First,  the  costs  to  the  US  of  affording  investors  the  privilege  of  circumventing  domestic  courts  in  
host   countries   are   high,   particularly   in   light   of   such   weak   evidence   of   ISDS’s   necessity.  
Subnational  and  national  jurisdictions  around  the  world  are  fiercely  competing  to  attract  and  keep  
investment  so  as  to  benefit  from  the  jobs,  technology,  and  capital  such  investment  can  inject  into  
their   economies.   To   engage   in   this   competition,   governments   are   using   promotional   tools,  
struggling  to  improve  their  performance  on  governance  indices,  and  granting  fiscal,  financial  and  
regulatory   incentives   to   make   themselves   attractive   destinations   for   foreign   investors.   Not  
surprisingly,  research  has  indicated  that  in  non-­‐‑OECD  countries,  foreign  multinational  enterprises  
already  exercise  significantly  greater  power  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  government  than  domestic  companies.xxx  
In   fact,   there   is   evidence   that   the   existence   of   a   treaty   with   ISDS   is   not   even   influential   in  
investors’  decisions  to  invest.xxxi  In  light  of  these  dynamics,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  a  supranational  
arbitration  system  is  also  needed  to  further  discipline  governments  and  ensure  that  they  provide  
investment-­‐‑friendly  destinations.    
Second,   investors   concerned   about   their   ability   to   obtain   justice   in   the   host   state’s   legal  
environment  can  secure  political  risk  insurance  from  the  market  to  protect  against  losses  suffered  
by  various  types  of  wrongful  government  conduct.xxxii  Political  risk  insurance  also  offers  a  policy  
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benefit   investment   treaties   do   not:   as   compared   to   investment   treaties   –  which   compensate   for  
political  risk  at  a  flat,  zero-­‐‑premium  rate  that  does  not  take  into  account  the  investment  climate  or  
quality   of   governance   in   the   host   country   –   political   risk   insurance   can   send  market   signals   to  
investors  and  host  countries  about  the  types  of  conduct  that  do  and  do  not  establish  a  sound  and  
predictable  business   environment  and   that   should  be   rewarded  by   increased   investment.   If,   for  
example,  a  foreign  jurisdiction  is  deeply  corrupt  and  lacking  an  independent  judiciary,  investment  
treaties  should  not  reward  that  jurisdiction  by  subsidizing  investment  into  it.    
A   third   and   final   key  point   is   that   ISDS   lessens   the   pressure   on   governments   to   improve   their  
domestic   legal   systems   for   the   benefit   of   all.   To   the   contrary,   the   risk   of   liability   for   judicial  
decisions,   legislative  changes  and  regulatory  acts  that  negatively  affect  the  economic  interests  of  
foreign   investors   may   well   create   a   “regulatory   chill,”   stifling   important   legal   reforms   in   the  
general  public  interest.  Instead  of  prioritizing  select  rights  for  foreign  investors,  the  international  
community  should  be  creating   incentives   for  all  governments   to  strengthen  their  domestic   legal  
frameworks  so   that   they  are  capable  of  developing  and  enforcing   laws  that  protect  and   regulate  
business  activities.  
  
An	  Unprecedented	  and	  Dangerous	  Expansion	  of	  ISDS	  Coverage	  	  	  
  
As  experience  under  the  NAFTA  shows,  foreign  investors  will  use  ISDS  when  available,  even  if  
the   host   government   has   a   stable   and   well-­‐‑functioning   domestic   legal   system   through   which  
investors  could  pursue  their  claims.  Indeed,  the  risk  of  being  sued  is  correlated  with  the  amount  
of  foreign  investment  covered  by  treaties,xxxiii  which  is  particularly  important  for  the  US  given  the  
number  of  new  investors  that  would  be  covered  by  TTIP  and  TPP  alone.      
The   eight   largest   sources   of   foreign   investment   in   the   US   –   Canada,   France,   Germany,   Japan,  
Luxembourg,   the  Netherlands,   Switzerland,   and   the  United   Kingdom   –   accounted   for   roughly  
80%  of  the  approximately  $2.8  trillion  of  foreign  direct  investment  in  the  US  at  the  end  of  2013.xxxiv  
Of  those  eight,  the  United  States  currently  has  a  treaty  with  only  one  –  Canada  –  that  permits  ISDS  
claims  against  the  United  States.  Investment  from  Canada  accounted  for  less  than  10%  of  foreign  
direct  investment  in  the  United  States.xxxv    
If,  however,   the  United  States  concludes  the  TTIP  and  TPP  and  includes  ISDS  in  each,   investors  
from   seven   of   the   eight   major   inward   investing   countries   will   be   protected,   who   together  
represented  over  70%  of  FDI  in  the  US  at  the  end  of  2013.xxxvi  This  does  not  even  include  investors  
from   countries   other   than   those   eight   that  would   also   be   covered   under   the   TTIP   and   TPP,   or  
those  that  would  be  covered  under  the  treaty  with  China.    
In  numerical  terms,  fewer  than  10,000  investors  in  the  United  States  are  currently  covered  by  an  
investment   treaty  with  an   ISDS  provision.   If   the  TPP  were   to   include   ISDS,   that  number  would  
nearly  double.  With  the  TTIP,  that  number  would  nearly  quadruple.  If  both  treaties  were  to  come  
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into  force,  the  US’s  exposure  would  be  nearly  five  times  greater  than  it  is  at  present,  not  including  
investors  potentially  covered  under  a  BIT  with  China.xxxvii  And  in  addition  to  the  sheer  number  of  
investors   that  would  be  covered  by  a   treaty,   the   rise  of   third-­‐‑party   funding   for   investor   claims,  
which  reduces  the  financial  risk  for  investors  bringing  those  lawsuits,  will  also  likely  increase  the  
overall  number  of  cases  brought  by  investors.  
US	  Experience	  with	  ISDS	  
  
The  United  State  Trade  Representative  (USTR)  often  responds  to  concerns  about  ISDS  by  stating  
that   the   US   has   yet   to   lose   an   ISDS   case.xxxviii     This   is   little   comfort   for   two   reasons.   First,   as  
indicated  above,  the  number  of  ISDS  disputes  is  correlated  with  the  number  of  covered  investors,  
and   under   TTIP   and   TPP,   the   number   of   covered   investors   would   quintuple,   considerably  
increasing  the  US’s  exposure  and  potential  liability  under  ISDS.    
Second,   even   in   cases   in  which   the  US  has  ultimately  won,   it   has   lost   on   important   issues.   For  
example,  in  the  recently  decided  dispute,  Apotex  Holdings  v.  United  States,  the  tribunal  rejected  the  
US’s  position  on  a  key  jurisdictional  point,  thereby  significantly  expanding  the  US’s  exposure  to  
future   ISDS   claims.   In   that   case,   Apotex   Holdings   brought   an   ISDS   claim   under   the   NAFTA,  
seeking   compensation   for   actions   taken   by   the   US   Food   and   Drug   Administration   (FDA)   to  
restrict  imports  into  the  US  of  “adulterated”  drugs  that  were  manufactured  by  Apotex  Holding’s  
subsidiaries   in  Canada.  The  US  FDA  had  restricted   those   imports   into   the  US  after   finding   that  
Apotex  Holding’s  Canadian  manufacturing  facilities  had  repeatedly  and  seriously  violated  good  
manufacturing  practice  standards.    
The   US   government   argued   to   the   tribunal   of   arbitrators   that   to   allow   the   Canadian   drug  
company   to   use   ISDS   to   challenge   the   FDA’s   enforcement   of   health   and   safety   rules   against  
Canadian  drug  manufacturers  in  Canada  would  be  to  “impermissibly  …  expand  the  boundaries  of  
NAFTA  Chapter  11  far  beyond  anything  the  NAFTA  Parties  contemplated  when  they  concluded  
Treaty.”xxxix  Such   claims,   the   US   argued,   “are   manifestly   outside   the   scope   of   [the   NAFTA’s  
investment   chapter]   and   should   be   dismissed   for   lack   of   jurisdiction.”xl  The   tribunal   disagreed,  
and   allowed   the   case   to   proceed,   signaling   to   other   foreign  manufacturers   that   ISDS   can   be   a  
viable  way  to  challenge  import  restrictions  imposed  by  US  regulators  for  health,  safety,  or  other  
legitimate  reasons.xli    
ISDS  tribunals  have  similarly  declined  to  accept  the  US’s  and  its  treaty  parties’  interpretations  and  
clarifications  of  the  meaning  of  substantive  treaty  standards.xlii  This  is  important  to  understand  as  
it   illustrates   the   significant   and   unchecked   power   of   tribunals   to   interpret   treaty   provisions  
differently  from  the  state  parties'ʹ  stated  understanding  of  the  treaty  text.  Once  states  delegate  such  
considerable   powers   to   arbitrators   to   interpret   and   apply   investment   provisions   through   ISDS,  
those  powers  are  exceedingly  difficult  to  rein  in.    
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In  light  of  the  coming  sea  change  in  exposure,  it  is  crucial  to  acknowledge  the  implications  of  ISDS  
for   the   domestic   legal   system   and   domestic   liability.   Note   that   the   key   concern   is   not   that   the  
government  will   be   challenged   for   its   conduct;   as   noted   above,   challenges   to   a   broad   range   of  
government   actions   and   inactions   are   permitted   under   domestic   law,   and   are   critical   for   both  
holding  the  government  accountable  for  harms  and  providing  a  mechanism  for  constant  reform  
and  upgrading  of  the  domestic  legal  system.  Rather,  the  key  concern  about  ISDS  is  that  it  allows  
foreign   investors   –   and   foreign   investors   alone   –   to   circumvent   and   override   the   otherwise  
applicable  domestic   legal   framework,  undermining  domestic   law  and  the  rights  and  interests  of  
others,   including   domestic   companies   and   state   and   local   regulators.   Moreover,   it   outsources  
decisions   regarding   complex   questions   of   law   and   policy   to   private   arbitrators   who   lack   the  
democratic   legitimacy   and   are   free   from   the   checks   and   balances   that   govern   administrative,  
judicial  and  legislative  actors.        
  
The	  “No	  Greater	  Substantive	  Rights”	  Question	  	  
To  address  concerns  about  ISDS,  the  US  Government  has  insisted  that  the  treaties  are  “designed  
to   provide   no   greater   substantive   rights   to   foreign   investors   than   are   afforded   under   the  
Constitution  and  US  law.”xliii  Yet,  as  explained  below,  even  if  that  is  the  intent,  it  is  simply  not  the  
reality.    
In  support  of  its  assertion  that  investment  treaties  provide  no  greater  protections  than  those  under  
domestic   law,   the   USTR   has   explained   that   particular   treaty   standards   merely   “mirror”   US  
domestic   standards   of   protection.   For   instance,   the   USTR   asserts,   the   treaty   obligation   not   to  
“expropriate”  property  is  akin  to  the  Fifth  Amendment  protection  against  uncompensated  takings  
in  the  US  Constitution.xliv  But  while  some  of  the  concepts  are  similar,  the  means  by  which  they  are  
judged  and  applied  are  not  the  same  as  under  U.S.  law.  
Identifying   a   “taking”   under   US   Constitutional   law   is   a   notoriously   complex   undertaking,  
governed  by  several  different  tests  and  a  wealth  of  jurisprudence,  providing  crucial  guidance  and  
rules   on   how   to   interpret   and   apply   those   tests.xlv  While   one   of   these   domestic   law   tests   –   the  
“Penn  Central”  test   -­‐‑-­‐‑   is  roughly  reflected  in  the  US’s   investment  treaties,   the  other  tests  are  not;  
moreover,  when  applying  the  treaty’s  version  of  the  vaguely  worded  “Penn  Central”  test,  tribunals  
are   not   bound   by   crucial   domestic   precedent.   Consequently,   the   line   tribunals   draw   between  
legitimate   regulatory   conduct   and   expropriations   requiring   compensation   can   be   very  different  
from  that  drawn  by  domestic  authorities,  and  can  result  in  greater  rights  being  granted  to  foreign  
investors  than  would  be  recognized  under  domestic   law.  The  mere  facial  similarity  between  the  
property  rights  protections  in  treaties  and  domestic  law  is  far  from  a  guarantee  that  treaty  rights  
provide  no  stronger  substantive  protections  than  the  domestic  system.    
The  “fair  and  equitable  treatment”  (FET)  treaty  standard,  another  common  feature  of  investment  
treaties,   raises   similar   issues.  Although   the  USTR  has  explained   that  FET   is   simply  a  protection  
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against  “denial  of   justice”   in  “criminal,   civil,  or  administrative  adjudicatory  proceedings,”xlvi  the  
obligation  has  frequently  been  interpreted  by  tribunals  to  go  well  beyond  such  a  basic  “denial  of  
justice”   standard.   Rather,   according   to   tribunals,   the   FET   obligation   is   a   type   of   “catch-­‐‑all”  
provision   that   can   be   used   to   penalize   governments   for   a   wide   range   of   conduct   otherwise  
legitimate  under  domestic  law.    
For  example,  a  tribunal  interpreting  the  “fair  and  equitable  treatment”  (FET)  obligation  in  the  US-­‐‑
Ecuador  investment  treaty  explained  that  the  FET  standard  “certainly”  imposes  an  “obligation  not  
to  alter  the  legal  and  business  environment  in  which  the  investment  has  been  made.”xlvii  Similarly,  
when  interpreting  the  FET  standard  in  the  US’s  agreement  with  Turkey,  the  tribunal  proclaimed  
that  the  obligation  was  “seriously  breached”  as  a  result  of  “continuing  legislative  changes.”xlviii  In  
marked   contrast   to   those   pronouncements   of   treaty   law,   US   domestic   law   does   not   provide  
investors  with  such  broad  protections  against  the  risk  of  legal  change.xlix  
The  FET  and  non-­‐‑discrimination  standards  in  investment  treaties  have  also  been  interpreted  and  
applied   to   protect   against   “manifestly   arbitrary”   and   discriminatory   conduct.   Under   these  
interpretations,   the   treaty   standards  may   be   seen   as   parallel   to   protections   provided  under   the  
federal   Administrative   Procedures   Act   (APA)l  and   state   law   analogues.   Yet,   when   scrutinizing  
agency   conduct  under   these   treaty   standards,   tribunals  operate   free  of   the  myriad  precise   rules  
that  govern  –  and  constrain  –  judicial  review  of  agency  conduct  at  the  domestic  level.    
This  difference  has   significant   ramifications.   In  particular,   the  APA  and  case   law   interpreting   it  
establish  a  nuanced  scheme  governing  the  grounds  for  challenging  agency  action,  the  means  to  do  
so,   and   the   remedies   available   when   challenges   are   successful.   The   APA   also   provides   that  
judicial   review   of   agency   action  may   be   barred   if   either   restricted   by   statute   or   committed   to  
agency   discretion   by   law.li  As   stated   by   the   Supreme  Court,   the  APA’s   principle   purpose   is   to  
"ʺprotect  agencies  from   undue   judicial   interference   with   their   lawful   discretion,   and   to   avoid  
judicial   entanglement   in   abstract   policy   disagreements,   which   courts   lack   both   expertise   and  
information   to   resolve."ʺlii  Consequently,   when   domestic   actors   seek   to   challenge   agency   action  
under  the  APA,  their  ability  to  successfully  do  so  is  subject  to  important  statutory  limits  designed  
to  restrict  judicial  interference  with  specialized  agency  knowledge.  
Foreign  investors  seeking  to  contest  adverse  agency  action  under  ISDS,  however,  are  not  similarly  
limited   by   the  APA  or   other   statutes   or  doctrines   governing   judicial   review  of   agency   action.liii  
When   reviewing   the   investors’   claims,   tribunals   are   not   bound   by   the   detailed   substantive  
principles   of   US   law   and   regulation.   Accordingly,   tribunals   have   availed   themselves   of   their  
power   to   conduct   more   searching   reviews   of   agency   action   and   order   different   remedies   as  
compared  to  domestic  courts.    
For   example,   in  Apotex   Holdings   v.   United   States,   the   investors   used   ISDS   to   challenge   the   US  
FDA’s  decision  to  impose  an  “Import  Alert”  on  adulterated  drugs  their  affiliates  manufactured  in  
Canada.  As  part  of  their  argument,  the  investors  alleged  that  the  FDA  violated  the  NAFTA’s  non-­‐‑
discrimination   obligations   by   restricting   imports   of   their   affiliates’   adulterated   drugs   but   not  
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taking  similarly  strong  enforcement  action  against  other  non-­‐‑compliant  companies.  According  to  
Apotex  Holdings  and  its  affiliates,  they  should  not  have  been  penalized  by  the  FDA  when  other  
substandard  performers  were  not.  
It   is  questionable  as   to  whether   such  a   challenge   to   the  FDA’s  enforcement  actions  would  even  
have   been   permitted   under   domestic   law.   The   Supreme   Court   “has   recognized   on   several  
occasions  over  many  years  that  an  agency'ʹs  decision  not  to  prosecute  or  enforce,  whether  through  
civil  or  criminal  process,  is  a  decision  generally  committed  to  an  agency'ʹs  absolute  discretion”  and  
unsuitable  for  judicial  review  under  the  APA:liv    
The  reasons  for  this  general  unsuitability  are  many.  First,  an  agency  decision  not  to  enforce  
often  involves  a  complicated  balancing  of  a  number  of  factors  which  are  peculiarly  within  
its  expertise.  Thus,  the  agency  must  not  only  assess  whether  a  violation  has  occurred,  but  
whether  agency  resources  are  best  spent  on  this  violation  or  another,  whether  the  agency  is  
likely  to  succeed  if  it  acts,  whether  the  particular  enforcement  action  requested  best  fits  the  
agency'ʹs   overall   policies,   and,   indeed,   whether   the  agency  has   enough   resources   to  
undertake  the  action  at  all.  An  agency  generally  cannot  act  against  each  technical  violation  
of  the  statute  it  is  charged  with  enforcing.  The  agency  is  far  better  equipped  than  the  courts  
to  deal  with  the  many  variables  involved  in  the  proper  ordering  of  its  priorities.lv    
The   foreign   investors’   claims   before   the   ISDS   tribunal,   however,   were   unconstrained   by   these  
domestic  law  rules.  The  tribunal’s  review  of  the  FDA’s  actions  and  inactions–  contrary  to  standard  
practice  under  the  APAlvi  –  went  beyond  the  administrative  record  and  was  unrestrained  by  any  
clear  standards  confining  the  tribunal’s  review  of  the  facts  or  law.lvii    
Ultimately,   the   tribunal   agreed   that   the   FDA   had   justifiable   reasons   for   treating   the   Canadian  
manufacturing   facilities   more   harshly   than   other   drug   manufacturers   found   to   have   similar  
violations.   Nevertheless,   the   US’   win   on   that   point   should   not   mask   the   more   fundamental  
meaning   of   the   case   –   namely,   that   future   claimants  who  want   to   challenge   agency   action   can  
bypass  the  APA’s  more  specific  rules  that  might  restrict  such  a  review  and  instead  have  a  private  
panel  of  party-­‐‑appointed  arbitrators  scrutinize  the  agency’s  conduct  on  grounds  and  to  an  extent  
unallowable  under  domestic  law.    
The  range  of  agency  actions  that  companies  could  dispute  through  this  route  is  broad.  Within  the  
specific   area   of   “Import   Alerts,”   for   example,   one   could   foresee   a   rise   in   the   use   of   ISDS   to  
challenge  FDA  decisions  restricting  entry  of  unsafe  drugs,  food,  and  other  products  following  the  
decision   in  Apotex  that   left   the   door   open   to   such   lawsuits.     The   implications   of   this   are  
particularly  significant  given  that   imports  of   foreign  drugs  and  food  items  are   likely  to   increase  
with  the  TPP  and  other  trade  and  investment  agreements.    
The  majority  decision  in  Bilcon  v.  Canada  provides  another  example  of  an  ISDS  tribunal  reviewing  
administrative   decisions   without   the   standard   domestic   restraints,   and   offering   remedies  
otherwise  not  available  under  domestic  law.  In  that  case,  the  ISDS  tribunal  determined  that  it  was  
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“arbitrary”  and  a  violation  of  the  fair  and  equitable  treatment  standardlviii  for  a  panel  of  experts  to  
consider   “core   community   values”   as   part   of   the   experts’   assessment   of   a   proposed   project’s  
impacts  on  the  human  environment,  economy,  life  style,  social  traditions,  or  quality  of  life.lix  The  
arbitrators  are  still  deciding  how  much  money  to  award  the  investor  as  damages.    
The  ISDS  decision  reflects  no  deference  to  the  expert  panel’s  understanding  of  the  environmental  
impact   assessment   regulations   governing   that   panel’s   task.   Rather,   the   decision   evidences   a  
willingness  of  international  tribunals  to  stand  in  for  domestic  agencies  and  courts  and  assume  the  
role   of   developing   and   interpreting   principles   on   proper   administrative   conduct.   As   the  
dissenting  arbitrator  said,  the  decision  illustrates  not  only  how  ISDS  tribunals  take  into  their  own  
hands  the  issue  of  proper  application  of  domestic  environmental  law,  but  also  how  their  decisions  
can   “import[]   a   damages   remedy   that   is   otherwise   not   available”,   with   potentially   costly  
implications  for  governments.lx  
Even   if   the   treaty  were   to   try   to   prescribe   specific   substantive   rights   that  were   no   greater   than  
those  under  domestic   law,   tribunals  –   typically   comprised  of  arbitrators  who  are  not  experts   in  
domestic  law  –  may  err  in  their  analysis  of  what  that  domestic  law  is  or  how  it  would  apply  to  the  
case  before   the   tribunal.     And   in   such  a   case,   the  government  would  not  be  able   to  appeal   any  
such   decision   on   the   ground   that   the   arbitrators   got   the   law   wrong.   The   government   would  
remain  bound  by  the  tribunal’s  interpretation.lxi    
Consequently,   given   the   wide   and   largely   unchecked   power   arbitrators   have   to   interpret   the  
rights   and   protections   offered   in   investment   treaties,   and   the   absence   of   specific   doctrines   in  
international   investment   law,   treaties  do   afford   “greater   substantive   rights”   to   foreign   investors  
than  are  provided  for  investors  or  other  constituents  under  domestic  law.      
  
The	  Bigger	  Picture:	  Beyond	  a	  Misleading	  Focus	  on	  “Substantive	  Rights”	  	  
  
Equally  importantly,  the  Administration’s  focus  on  whether  the  treaties  give  greater  “substantive”  
rights   is   misleading;   it   ignores   the   crucial   and   often   determinative   role   of   procedural   law   in  
shaping  the  outcomes  of  claims  and  defenses.  
Indeed,   the   line   between   “substantive”   and   “procedural”   law   is   infamously   problematic.   It   is  
tellingly  “often  described  with  unflattering  adjectives  such  as  ‘vague,’  ‘unpredictable,’  ‘imprecise,’  
‘amorphous,’   ‘unresolvable,’   ‘unclear,’   ‘chameleon-­‐‑like,’   ‘murky,’   ‘blurry,’   ‘hazy,’   and   ‘superbly  
fuzzy.’”lxii  Many  rules  typically  labeled  “procedural”  can  affect  the  outcome  of  substantive  claims.  
Indeed,  "ʺ[t]o  speak  of  procedural  and  substantive  rules  as  if  each  can  be  defined  independently  of  
the  other  is  inaccurate.  Law  is  the  product  of  an  interaction  between  substance  and  procedure."ʺlxiii  
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Forum	  Shopping	  to	  Gain	  Access	  to	  ISDS	  Procedures	  
Domestic   law   includes   a   complex   set   of   “procedural”   principles   and   rules   that   are   often  
determinative  of  the  success  of  judicial  claims.  These  include  such  questions  as:    
• Who  can  bring  claims?    (e.g.,  do  doctrines  of  standing  prevent  the  suit?)  
• Under  what   circumstances?      (e.g.,  do   issues  of   ripeness,   statutes  of   limitation,  or   exhaustion  
restrict  the  claims?    are  all  indispensible  third  parties  joined  so  that  the  case  can  proceed?)  
• What   level   of   scrutiny   or   deference   must   the   court   or   tribunal   accord?      (e.g.,   is   the   claim  
challenging  an  administrative  decision,  a   lower  court  decision  on  an  issue  of   law,  or  a   lower  
court  decision  on  an  issue  of  fact?)  
•   What   rules  of   evidence  and  privileges   apply?      (e.g.,  how  do  applicable   rules  on   taking  and  
reliability  of  evidence   impact  claims  or  defenses?  what   is   the  relevance  of  privileges   like   the  
“deliberative  process  privilege”?)  
• What   can   the   court   consider?      (e.g.,   can   it   consider   new   evidence,   only   evidence   in   the  
administrative  record,  only  evidence  introduced  at  trial?)  
• What  remedies  are  available?      (e.g.,   can   the  court  order  removal  of   the  measure,  declaratory  
relief,  compensatory  damages,  or  punitive  damages?)  
• Do  doctrines  of  abstention   limit  claims  or   require   them  to  be  decided   in  a  particular   forum?  
  
The  strict  contours  of  these  questions  that  have  been  formed  over  centuries  in  US  domestic  law  do  
not   apply   in   ISDS.  When   any   of   these   procedural   barriers   would   be   unfavorable   to   a   foreign  
investor’s   position   (or   if   an   investor   loses   in   domestic   courts   for   the   same   reason),   a   foreign  
investor  with  access  to  ISDS  can  bypass  these  rules  by  bringing  its  case  to  international  arbitration  
in  search  of  a  better  outcome.lxiv    
Table  1  below  illustrates  how  foreign  investors  may  “forum  shop”  in  this  manner  by  repackaging  
domestic   law  claims  as  treaty  claims.  Takings  claims  under  US  federal   law  could  be  framed,  for  
example,  as  expropriation  claims  under  a  treaty;  claims  of  substantive  due  process  under  US  law  
could  be  framed  as  expropriation  claims,  fair  and  equitable  treatment  claims,  or  “umbrella  clause”  
claims   under   a   treaty;   and   challenges   under   the   US   Administrative   Procedures   Act   or   state  
analogues  could  be  framed  as  expropriation,  fair  and  equitable  treatment,  non-­‐‑discrimination,  and  
umbrella  clause  claims  under  a  treaty.    
Even   if   it   could   be   said   that,   in   theory,   these   purely   substantive   standards   of   protection   under  
investment  treaties  were  the  same  as  those  under  domestic  law,  the  procedural  avenues  through  
which  those  standards  are  enforced  can  render  the  substantive  standards  different  –  and  greater  –  
in   practice.   This   in   turn   exposes   the   government   to   litigation   and   liability   to   an   extent   not  
permitted  under  domestic   law  and  undermines   the  government’s  ability   to   take   regulatory  and  
other   actions   that   are   adverse   to   foreign   investors   without   the   risk   of   having   to   pay   costly  
compensation.      
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Table  1.  Parallels  between  Domestic  and  Treaty  Law  Claims  
US  Domestic  Law  Claims  against  Govt.   Treaty  Claims  against  Govt.  
Takings   Expropriation  
Substantive  due  process   Expropriation  
Fair  and  equitable  treatment  
Umbrella  clause  
Procedural  due  process   Fair  and  equitable  treatment    
Contract  breach   Expropriation  
Fair  and  equitable  treatment  
Umbrella  clause  
Challenges  to  administrative  or  regulatory  actions   Expropriation  
Fair  and  equitable  treatment    
National  treatment  and  MFN  treatment  
Umbrella  clause  
Tort  claims   Fair  and  equitable  treatment  
  
  
Highlighting	  the	  Importance	  of	  Procedure:	  The	  Role	  of	  Abstention	  Doctrines	  
  
Abstention  doctrines  help  to  illustrate  these  issues  in  more  detail.    
Under  domestic  law,  abstention  doctrines  are  relevant  when  the  same  or  similar  issues  are  being  
brought,  may  be  brought,  or  have  been  brought  in  different  court  systems  (e.g.,  state  or  federal),  
and  there  is  a  question  about  the  proper  place  to  decide  the  matter.lxv    Abstention  doctrines,  like  
the  Rooker-­‐‑Feldman   doctrine,   reflect   the   principle   of   federalism   embodied   in   the   domestic   legal  
system.  Rooker-­‐‑Feldman  bars  “cases  brought  by  state-­‐‑court  losers  complaining  of  injuries  by  state-­‐‑
court   judgments”   who   then   seek   federal   “district   court   review   and   rejection   of   those  
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judgments.”lxvi  Only  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  the  discretion  to  review  state  court  judgments;lxvii  
federal  district  courts  do  not.  
Assume,   for   example,   that   an   individual   sued   a   foreign-­‐‑owned   company   arguing   that   the  
company  caused  her  harm  as  a  result  of  the  company’s  emission  of  pollutants  into  her  source  of  
water.   If   she   lost   her   case   in   the   state   court   system,   Rooker-­‐‑Feldman   would   prevent   her   from  
seeking   to  undo  the  state  court   judgment  by   turning   to   federal  district  court.lxviii  She  would  also  
not  be  able  to  turn  to  a  mechanism  like  ISDS  to  challenge  the  decision.  The  most  she  could  hope  
for  would  be  discretionary  review  by  the  US  Supreme  Court,  a  highly  unlikely  scenario  in  light  of  
the  limited  percentage  of  cases  the  Court  agrees  to  hear.    
In  contrast,  if  the  company  lost  the  state  court  case  and  was  ordered  to  pay  the  plaintiff  damages,  
the  company  could  seek  to  challenge  that  state  court  decision  by  bringing  a  claim  against  the  US  
government   in   ISDS   and   alleging   that   the   procedure   or   substance   of   the   domestic   court  
proceedings   violated   international   law.lxix  The   ISDS   tribunal   would   be   the   final   arbiters   of   the  
legitimacy   of   state   court   proceedings   and   outcomes,   and  would  not   only   have   the   authority   to  
award  damages  for  the  unfavorable  state  court  decision,  but  also  would  not  be  obligated  to  apply  
domestic  law  in  adjudicating  the  dispute.    
ISDS  thus  becomes  a  mechanism  through  which  foreign  investors  alone  have  an  extra  opportunity  
to   contest   and   seek   compensation   for   unfavorable   outcomes   from   state-­‐‑court   litigation.   This  
increases   the   pressure   foreign   investors   with   access   to   ISDS   can   put   on   legal   doctrines   and  
decisions   that   are   adverse   to   their   positions   in   legal   disputes   with   other   individuals,  
organizations,   state  or   local  government  entities,  domestic  companies,  or   foreign  companies  not  
covered  by   investment   treaties.  By  providing   select   foreign   investors   this   recourse   to   ISDS,   law  
becomes  asymmetrical,  favoring  those  foreign  investors  over  other  interests  and  parties.lxx    
Additionally,   by   freeing   foreign   investors   from   restraints   imposed   by   abstention   doctrines,  
providing   those   investors   unique   access   to   investment   arbitration,   and   conveying   powers   on  
arbitrators   to   scrutinize   conduct   of   any   state   actor,   ISDS   undermines   the   authority   of   state  
administrative  and  judicial  bodies  to  develop,  interpret  and  apply  the  law.  
The  Burford  abstention  doctrine  illustrates  how  ISDS  shifts  this  authority  to  develop,  interpret  and  
apply   law.   Under   the   Burford   abstention   doctrine,   the   general   rule   is   that   where   timely   and  
adequate  state-­‐‑court  review  of  a  state  agency  action  is  available,  a  federal  court  sitting  in  equity  
must  decline   to   interfere  with   the  proceedings  or  orders  of   state  administrative  agencies   in   two  
circumstances:lxxi    
(1)   when  there  are  “difficult  questions  of  state  law  bearing  on  policy  problems  of  substantial  
public  import  whose  importance  transcends  the  result  in  the  case  then  at  bar”;  or    
(2)   where  the  “exercise  of  federal  review  of  the  question  in  a  case  and  in  similar  cases  would  
be   disruptive   of   state   efforts   to   establish   a   coherent   policy   with   respect   to   a   matter   of  
substantial  public  concern.”lxxii    
     




The  doctrine  is  based  on  the  premise  that  “[d]elay,  misunderstanding  of  local   law,  and  needless  
federal  conflict  with  state  policy,”  would  be  “the  inevitable  product”  of  a  system  in  which  losing  
parties  before  state  administrative  agencies  in  these  sensitive  areas  of  law  turned  to  federal  courts  
for  relief.lxxiii    
Table   2.   Comparing   Substantive   and   Procedural   Issues   in   Domestic   and   Treaty   Law:   select  
examples  




• must  comply  with  requirements  to  
exhaust  local  remedies;  
• suits  by  shareholders  for  harms  to  
the  company  limited;  
• case  may  not  be  able  to  proceed  if  
indispensible  3rd  parties  are  not  able  
to  join.    
e.g.,  
• claimants  are  not  subject  to  requirements  to  
exhaust  local  remedies;lxxiv  
• tribunals  have  given  shareholders  broad  rights  
of  standing  to  bring  claims  for  harms  to  the  
company;lxxv  
• cases  may  proceed  without  similar  protections  




Claims  against  government  defined  
by  domestic  law  (APA,  takings  
claims,  due  process  challenges,  
breach  of  contract,  tort,  etc.)  
Claims  against  government  brought  under  treaty  
standards.  Legitimacy  of  the  government  action  




Federal  courts  may  abstain  from  
taking  jurisdiction  for  various  policy  
reasons  including  to  respect  
principles  of  federalism.  Under  the  
Burford  doctrine,  for  example,  federal  
courts  may  abstain  from  taking  the  
case  when  it  deals  with  a  sensitive  
matter  of  state  or  local  policy.  
There  is  no  doctrine  of  abstention  for  policy  
grounds.  Tribunals  with  jurisdiction  hold  they  
must  hear  claims  irrespective  of  the  domestic  
policies  at  issue  or  availability  of  other  fora  
where  the  claims  could  be  heard.    
Evidentiary  
issues  
For  policy  purposes,  statutory  and  
judicial  doctrines  like  the  
“deliberative  process  privilege”  have  
been  created  to  guard  against  
discovery  and  use  of  certain  
government  information  in  litigation  
against  the  government.  
Tribunals  may   be   guided   by   or   apply   domestic  
rules   on   privilege   or   taking   or   admission   of  
evidence,  but  are  not  bound  by  them.lxxvi  
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Unlike  federal  courts,  arbitral  tribunals  hearing  ISDS  claims  do  not  apply  this  abstention  doctrine.  
The  authority  that  the  Burford  doctrine  gives  state  institutions  to  shape  law  and  policy  can  thus  be  
overridden   by   ISDS   tribunals   vested   with   the   power   to   determine   the   legitimacy   of   decisions  
taken  at  any  level  of  government.  As  a  result,  when  faced  with  an  adverse  decision  by  a  local  or  
state  administrative  agency,  a  company  covered  by  an  investment  treaty  could  simply  opt  out  of  
the  state’s  legal  system  and  take  its  dispute  to  international  arbitration,  frustrating  “state  efforts  to  
establish  a  coherent  policy  with  respect  to  a  matter  of  substantial  public  concern.”lxxvii    
	  
The	  Well-­‐Known	  Problem	  with	  Greater	  Rights	  	  
  
Individually  and  together,  vague  substantive  treaty  standards  and  the  ISDS  mechanism  through  
which   they   are   interpreted   and   applied,   have   given   foreign   investors   greater   rights   than   they  
would  otherwise   enjoy  under  domestic   law.  This   system  offends  principles   behind   long-­‐‑settled  
US  doctrine.    
More   than   75   years   ago,   in   the   seminal   case   of  Erie   v.   Tompkins,   the   Supreme   Court   expressly  
denounced   this   type   of   two-­‐‑tiered   legal   system,   overruling   previous   doctrine   that   had   enabled  
non-­‐‑citizens  of  any  US  state  to  access  better  rights  than  citizens  by  electing  to  take  their  claims  to  
federal  rather  than  state  court.lxxviii  Although  that  two-­‐‑tiered  system  had  been  designed  to  prevent  
“discrimination   in   state   courts   against   those   not   citizens   of   the   State,”lxxixit   instead   “introduced  
grave  discrimination  by  non-­‐‑citizens  against  citizens”  because  it  gave  non-­‐‑citizens  the  “privilege  
of   selecting”  whether   to   take   their   disputes   to   federal   courts   and   benefit   from  more   favorable  
federal  law.lxxx    
Such  a  system,  the  Supreme  Court  declared  in  1938,  “rendered  impossible  equal  protection  of  the  
law”  and  gave  rise  to  injustice  and  confusion.lxxxi    
ISDS   raises   exactly   the   same   issues.   Based   on   the   fear   that   domestic   court   systems   would   be  
biased  again  non-­‐‑citizens,  ISDS  allows  non-­‐‑citizens  (and  only  non-­‐‑citizens)  access  to  preferential  
rights  and  processes,  giving  foreign  companies  and  their  shareholders  and  subsidiaries  the  same  




A  21st   century   trade  agreement   should  not  undo  policies   and   legal   frameworks   that  have  been  
and  continue  to  be  developed  and  refined  through  democratic  processes,  transparent  courts  and  
administrative   systems   checked   and  balanced   by   the   separation   of   powers.  And   a   21st   century  
legal  mechanism  should  not  undo  those   frameworks  especially   for  a  specific  set  of  actors  based  
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solely   on   their   nationality.   The   agreements   being   negotiated   by   the   Administration,   however,  
threaten  to  do  just  that.    
Some   reforms   have   been   proposed   to   address   the   growing   public   concerns   about   ISDS.   The  
European  Commission,  for  example,  recently  announced  its  desire  to  move  toward  establishing  a  
standing   investment   court   and   an   appellate  mechanism.  While   those   reforms  would   go   a   long  
way   toward   addressing   other   concerns   about   ISDS   that   are   not   addressed   in   this   paper—for  
instance,  the  potential  bias  of  arbitrators  and  the  inconsistency  of  decisions—they  do  not  address  
the   particular   concern   addressed   here,   namely   the   ability   of   foreign   investors   to   challenge  
regulations,  domestic  court  decisions,  and  other  administrative  acts  outside  of  the  domestic  legal  
system,  undermining  substantive  and  procedural  US  law  and  the  law-­‐‑making  process.  
  
Rather  than  further  entrenching  ISDS  through  TPP,  TTIP,  or  other  treaties,  the  US  should  take  the  
more  considered  step   to   remove   ISDS   from  future  agreements.  As  an  alternative   to   ISDS,   states  
could   agree   on   state-­‐‑to-­‐‑state   consultation   and   dispute   settlement   mechanisms   like   those  
commonly   used   to   settle   trade   disputes   under   international   treaties.   Extensive   experience   with  
state-­‐‑to-­‐‑state  dispute   settlement  mechanisms   in   trade  disputes   should   reassure   ISDS   supporters  
who   contend   that   resolving   investment   disputes   through   state-­‐‑to-­‐‑state   procedures   would  
undesirably  “politicize”  those  disputes.  Moreover,  while  “the  de-­‐‑politicisation  thesis  [in  favor  of  
ISDS]   is   widely   shared   amongst   lawyers,   it   has   never   been   subject   to   any   rigorous   empirical  
testing.”lxxxiii  
  
In   the   absence   of   ISDS,   investors   also  have   access   to  political   risk   insurance   that   protects   them  
from  losses  arising  out  of  expropriation,  breach  of  contract,  and  denial  of  justice,  the  same  types  of  
losses  that  are  covered  under  investment  treaties.  
  
Finally,  to  the  extent  foreign  investors  cannot  get  efficient  or  fair  relief  in  the  legal  system  of  host  
states,  trade  and  investment  treaties  can  use  cooperative  institutional  mechanisms  to  identify  the  
gaps  and  issues  in  those  legal  systems  and  help  to  address  them.  Not  only  will  such  efforts  help  to  
improve  dispute  settlement  between  investors  and  states,   it  will  also  enable  foreign  investors   to  
enjoy  greater   legal   security  when  dealing  with   consumers,   suppliers,   and   competitors,   and  will  
more  broadly  improve  the  investment  climate  of  the  host  country.    
                                                                                                 
i These features are present in investment treaties the US has already concluded and in the leaked chapter of the TPP. 
ii See e.g., Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional Measures, May 8, 2009; Chevron v. Ecuador, 
PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures, February 9, 2011.  
iii Award, June 8, 2009 (deciding in favor of the US on the merits).  
iv This case is still pending.  
v ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, Oct. 5, 2012 (deciding against Ecuador, and ordering payment of roughly USD 1.8 billion 
plus interest). 
vi ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1 (case still pending). 
vii ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5 (case still pending). 
viii ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (dismissed on jurisdiction). 
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ix PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award, Mar. 17, 2015 (deciding against Canada on the merits). 
x ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 (deciding against Turkey on the merits). 
xi ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, May 25, 2004 (deciding against Chile on the merits). 
xii ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Award, Sept. 12, 2014 (deciding against Ecuador on the merits). 
xiii ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Award, Dec. 14, 2012 (deciding against Ecuador on the merits). 
xiv LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, July 1, 2004 (decided against Ecuador on the merits). 
xv ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and Principles of Quantum, May 22, 2012, and Award, Feb. 20, 2015 
(deciding against Canada on the merits). 
xvi ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23 (deciding against Guatemala on the merits but not addressing the question of whether Guatemala 
violated obligations to protect against harm caused by third parties). 
xvii PCA Case No. 2009-23 (case still pending). 
xviii  ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5 (case still pending). 
xix ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (case still pending). 
xx ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, Dec. 19, 2013 (deciding against Guatemala on the merits). 
xxi ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award, Aug. 17, 2012 (deciding in favor of Guatemala). 
xxii ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (case still pending). 
xxiii ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (case still pending). 
xxiv PCA Case No. 2012-12 (case still pending). 
xxv ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (case still pending). 
xxvi ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (case still pending). 
xxvii  ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (case still pending). 
xxviii  ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 (case still pending). 
xxix See, e.g., Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, No. 13-5315 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2014) 
(finding in favor Chinese-owned US company’s claim that actions taken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) violated the investor’s Constitutional due process rights). 
xxx Emma Aisbett, “Powerful Multinationals or Persecuted Foreigners? ‘Foreignness’ and Influence over Government Rule-
Making” (2010) CEPR Discussion Paper No. 638. 
xxxi Lauge Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Yackee, “Trans-Atlantic Investment Treaty Protection,”, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Special Report No. 102/March 2015.  
xxxii For more on political risk insurance in this context, see, e.g., Gerald T. West, “Political risk investment insurance: a 
renaissance,” 5 J. PROJECT FINANCE 29 (1999); Lauge Poulsen, “The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and 
Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence,” YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009-
2010, OUP. 
xxxiii See Zoe Phillips Williams, “Risky Business or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor-State Disputes,” INVESTMENT TREATY 
NEWS, Aug. 12, 2014. 
xxxiv Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: 2014 Report, p. 3. 
xxxv Id. 
xxxvi  Id. 
xxxvii  This data is from Uniworld’s database, and has been compiled by Public Citizen. 
xxxviii  Office of the United States Trade Representative: Fact Sheets: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), March 2015, 
available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds. 
xxxix Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)12/1, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the 
Merits, November 18, 2013, p. 40. 
xl Id. 
xli For more on this decision see Lise Johnson, “New Weaknesses: Despite a major win, arbitration decisions in 2014 increase the 
US’s future exposure to litigation and liability” (CCSI January 2015), available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2015/01/15/new-
weaknesses-despite-a-major-win-arbitration-decisions-in-2014-increase-the-uss-future-exposure-to-litigation-and-liability/. 
xlii See, e.g., id. (discussing how the tribunal declined to accept the state parties’ position regarding the role of the most-favored 
nation provision). See also Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award, Mar. 17, 2015 (not applying rules for assessing 
customary international law despite the NAFTA parties’ clear and binding direction that the fair and equitable treatment standard 
is confined to customary international law).  
xliii Office of the United States Trade Representative: Fact Sheets: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), March 2015, 
available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds. 
xliv Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR): Fact Sheets: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), March 2015, 
available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds. 
xlv Federal jurisprudence approaches these questions applying different tests depending on whether the alleged interference with 
property rights is a physical interference (the Loretto test), a “total” taking (the Lucas test), a partial taking (the three-part Penn 
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Central test), or a condition on development (the Nollan/Dolan tests).  For a discussion of US law on regulatory takings, and a 
comparison with the doctrine of “indirect expropriation” under investment treaties, see Mathew Porterfield, “International 
Expropriation Rules and Federalism,” 23 STANFORD ENV’TL L.J. (2004).  
xlvi USTR, supra n. xliii. The US’s treaties do not expressly state that the fair and equitable treatment is limited to a denial of 
justice.  
xlvii Occidental v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, July 1, 2004, para. 191. 
xlviii PSEG v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, Jan. 19, 2007, para. 250. 
xlix See, e.g., Lise Johnson and Oleksandr Volkov, “Investor-state contracts, host-state ‘commitments’ and the myth of stability in 
international law,” (2013) 24:3, American Review of International Arbitration, 361-415.  
l The APA’s provisions on judicial review are contained in 5 USC §§ 701-706. 
li 5 USC § 701(a)(1) & (2). 
lii Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 US 55, 66 (2004); see also Anna T. Katselas, “Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a 
Deferential Standard of Review?, A Comparative Analysis of the US Administrative Procedure Act's Arbitrary and Capricious 
Standard of Review and the Fair and Equitable Treatment and Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures Treaty Standards,” 34 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 87, 95 
liii See also Katselas, supra n. lii, at 132 (The “comparison [between ISDS cases and claims under the APA] further illustrates that 
investment tribunals are not subject to the significant public law limitations that constrain US courts in APA review.”). 
liv Heckler v. Chaney, 470 US 821, 831 (1985) 
lv Id. at 831-32. 
lvi It "is black-letter administrative law that in an [Administrative Procedure Act] case, a reviewing court should have before it 
neither more nor less information that did the agency when it made its decision." CTS Corp. v. EPA, 759 F.3d 52, 64 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 US 
729, 743 (1985) (in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA, "[t]he focal point for judicial review should be 
the administrative record already in existence . . . ." (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 US 138, 142 (1973)). While the basic rule is to 
prevent consideration of extra-record evidence, federal courts have identified certain narrow circumstances in which it may be 
allowed. One is in cases when the agency is alleged to have acted in bad faith. Yet “normally there must be a strong showing of 
bad faith or improper behavior before the court may inquire into the thought processes of administrative decision makers." Pub. 
Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1982). 
lvii See Apotex Holdings, supra n. xxxix, paras. 8.61-8.77. The tribunal notes that the US urged deference, but does not engage in 
any substantial discussion of the proper standard of review. Moreover, in its analysis, it reviews extra-record information on the 
facts and law that was prepared for the investment arbitration, including testimony of FDA officials and expert submissions on 
domestic law.  
lviii Bilcon v. Canada, Award, March 17, 2015, para. 591. 
lix Bilcon v. Canada, Government of Canada – Rejoinder, March 21, 2013, para. 137. 
lx  Bilcon v. Canada, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, March 10, 2015, para. 48.    
lxi Arbitral awards issued under the ICSID Convention may only be annulled on five narrow grounds; Errors of fact or law are 
generally not considered to be among those grounds. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States, 575 UNTS 159 (1965), art. 52. Arbitration awards issued under the NY Convention may similarly only 
be challenged upon enforcement if set aside under the law of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration award was rendered, or if 
one of other identified grounds is established, none of which is or is typically interpreted to be an error of fact or law. See New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 38 (1968), art. V.   
lxii Thomas O. Main, “The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law,” 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 801, 815 (2014): 
lxiii Scott M. Matheson, Jr., “Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact on the First Amendment,” 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 215, 223 (1987)  
lxiv In the US, data shows that regulatory takings claims usually fail before they reach a decision on the merits or the substance, 
showing the importance of non-substantive rules. One study examining all regulatory takings cases from three different circuits in 
which the decision cited the key Penn Central test found that pre-merits dismissals were significant: 
 
In the courts of appeals, the merits were reached by the First Circuit in 8 out of 20 cases (40.0% of cases), by the Ninth 
Circuit in 16 out of 68 cases (23.5%), and by the Federal Circuit in 21 out of 74 cases (28.4%). In the trial courts, the 
merits were reached by First Circuit trial courts in 14 out of 35 cases (40.0%), by the Ninth Circuit trial courts in 27 out 
of 71 cases (38.0%), and by the Court of Federal Claims in 70 of 223 cases (31.4%).  
 
Adam R. Pomeroy, “Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or a One Strike Rule?”, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677, 
692.  
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Success among those cases that were decided on the merits was 11.9%. Overall success in all regulatory takings cases citing Penn 
Central was 4.0%. In his article, the author refers to similar studies that have likewise found a low chance of success on regulatory 
claims.  
lxv These doctrines operate as a narrow exception to the “virtually unflagging’ obligation of federal courts to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 US 800, 817 (1976). 
lxvi Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 US 280, 284 (2005). 
lxvii One exception to this is habeas petitions, which can be brought in federal district court to challenge state court decisions.  
lxviii In some US circuits, the courts apply a “fraud exception” to the doctrine, allowing plaintiffs to challenge a state court 
judgment in federal courts if the judgment was secured by fraud. For a discussion of this exception, see, e.g., Steven N. Baker, 
“The Fraud Exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: How It Almost Wasn’t (and Probably Shouldn’t Be),” 5 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 139 (2011). 
lxix The practice of investors using investor-state arbitration to challenge court decisions in cases between the investors and private 
parties are growing. The various disputes where this can be seen include Chevron v. Ecuador (PCA Case No. 2009-23), Eli Lilly 
v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2), and Awdi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13. 
lxx Notably, the individual who had brought the suit could not be a party to the investor-state arbitration even though the validity 
of the very court judgment she had obtained would be directly at issue. Indeed, as a non-party, she would not even have right to 
attend or make submissions in the dispute, or the power to determine whether to accept or reject a settlement offer given by the 
investor in that ISDS proceeding. The most the individual could hope for would be to participate as an “amicus curiae” able to 
make written or oral submissions to the tribunal; but this is a much narrower role than a role as an actual party to the litigation and 
even this route of participation is uncertain: Whether she could in fact participate would be decided at the tribunal’s discretion. 
There is no right to participate as amicus curiae.  
lxxi The Burford abstention doctrine can also apply in damages actions. The Supreme Court stated in Quackenbush v. Allstate: 
 
We have not strictly limited abstention to "equitable cases,"  but rather have extended the doctrine to all cases in which a 
federal court is asked to provide some form of discretionary relief. … Moreover, as demonstrated by our decision 
in Thibodaux, … we have not held that abstention principles are completely inapplicable in damages 
actions. Burford might support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages action pending the 
resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law.  
 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730-731 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
lxxii New Orleans Public Service, Incorporated v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 US 350, 361 (1989) (quoting Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 US 800 (1976)). 
lxxiii Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 US 315, 327 (1943). 
lxxiv As tribunals have interpreted investment treaties, exhaustion is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction. However, whether claimants 
exhaust local remedies may in some cases affect their ability to ultimately succeed on certain claims, in particular on fair and 
equitable treatment claims. The extent to which investors have pursued domestic remedies has not similarly affected analysis of 
other claims, such as national or most-favored nation treatment claims. See, e.g., Apotex Holdings, supra n. xxxix.  
lxxv For a discussion of these issues see, e.g., David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties as Corporate Law: Shareholder Claims and 
Issues of Consistency, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2013/03. The US has taken the position that treaties do 
not permit non-controlling shareholders to bring claims for harms to the company. Tribunals, however, have rejected that 
argument in disputes under treaties concluded by the US. See id.   
lxxvi See, e.g., Bilcon v. Canada, Procedural Order No. 13, July 11, 2012 (looking to NAFTA jurisprudence, applicable arbitration 
rules, and rules developed by the International Bar Association on taking of evidence in international arbitration to determine the 
extent to which the deliberative process privilege applied); Apotex Holdings, supra n. xxxix, Procedural Order on the Parties’ 
Respective Requests for Document Production, Mar. 29, 2003, pp. 24-26; id., Procedural Order on Document Production 
Regarding the Parties’ Respective Claims to Privilege and Privilege Logs, July 5, 2013, paras. 20-22. 
lxxvii Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 US 800, 814 (1976). 
lxxviii  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938). 
lxxix Id. at 74. 
lxxx Id. at 74-75. 
lxxxi Id. at 75. 
lxxxii The Supreme Court in Erie highlighted how companies would manufacture their foreignness: A company operating in State 
A would purposefully incorporate in State B in order be considered a non-citizen in State A. These same practices occur in ISDS, 
with individuals and entities setting up companies in certain countries in order to gain the protections of those countries 
investment treaties.   
lxxxiii Poulsen et al., supra n. xxxi at p. 15. 
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